Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor (1985) FULL SUMMARY

Discover the full summary of Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor (1985) — a landmark Supreme Court case in Nigeria that defined judicial immunity and the protection of public officers under the law.

The case of Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor (1985) remains a cornerstone in Nigerian jurisprudence on judicial immunity and the protection of public officers acting within the scope of their lawful duties. The Supreme Court, led by Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C.,examined the delicate balance between a citizen’s right to seek redress against wrongful official acts and the protection afforded to judges and public officers for actions taken in the discharge of their duties.

This judgment reaffirmed two deeply rooted legal doctrines in Nigerian law:

1.That a judge of a superior court is immune from liability for acts done in the exercise of judicial duties—even where those acts were done honestly but mistakenly.

2.That a public officer acting in the course of duty cannot be sued beyond the period prescribed by the Public Officers Protection Law.

Background and Facts of the Case Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor (1985)

The appellant, Fred Egbe, a legal practitioner residing in Victoria Island, Lagos, filed a writ of summons at the High Court of Lagos State seeking to quash an indictment brought against him. His claims alleged that the Chief Judge of Lagos State (1st respondent) and the Director of Public Prosecutions (2nd respondent) conspired to maliciously initiate criminal proceedings against him for personal reasons.

Egbe contended that the 1st respondent’s consent for his prosecution under Section 340(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act was tainted with bad faith, improper motive, and collusion. He claimed that the Chief Judge had a personal grievance against him for preventing a property from being rented and had thus abused the judicial process to settle personal scores.

The writ sought the following declarations:

1.That the document of consent issued by the Chief Judge for his prosecution was illegal and void.

2.That the said document was issued maliciously.

3.That the criminal charge preferred by the Director of Public Prosecutions was illegal and void.

Proceedings at the High Court

The defendants did not file a statement of defence but instead entered a conditional appearance and applied to strike out the action. They argued that the Chief Judge was immune from suit under Section 88(1) of the High Court Law of Lagos State,and that the D.P.P., being a public officer, was protected by the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. 92.

The High Court agreed with their arguments. It held that the Chief Judge acted in the discharge of his judicial duties and was thus protected from liability. The claim against the Director of Public Prosecutions was found to be statute-barred under Section 2(1) of the Public Officers Protection Law.Accordingly, the plaintiff’s action was dismissed in limine.

Appeal to the Court of Appeal

Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, contending that the Chief Judge’s act was outside jurisdiction because it was done with knowledge of its unlawfulness.The Court of Appeal, in a judgment delivered by Nnaemeka-Agu, J.C.A.dismissed the appeal, affirming that both the Chief Judge and the D.P.P. acted within their lawful capacities. However, the Court quashed the indictment against the appellant as being a nullity.

Still dissatisfied, Egbe appealed to the Supreme Court, insisting that a judge who knowingly acts unlawfully should not be shielded by the immunity provision of Section 88(1) of the High Court Law.

Key Issues Before the Supreme Court Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor (1985).

The Supreme Court considered the following key questions:

1.Under what circumstances can a judge of a superior court be held liable for acts done in the exercise of judicial functions under Section 88(1) of the High Court Law of Lagos State?

2.Whether an action lies against a judge for abuse of powers exercised within jurisdiction.

3.Whether a public officer can be sued after the limitation period provided under Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law.

4.Whether a court can pry into a defendant’s motive where the plaintiff discloses no reasonable cause of action.

5.Whether an appellant whose indictment had been nullified could still seek a declaration that the same indictment was illegal and void.

Judgment of the Supreme Court

Delivering the lead judgment, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C., described the case as one involving “issues of great constitutional and legal importance.” The learned Justice emphasized that while the right of a citizen to seek redress is fundamental, the judiciary must remain independent and protected from undue interference through personal suits against judges for acts performed in their official capacity.

“This appeal involves issues of great constitutional and legal importance… The issue to be decided in this appeal seems to me the result of the conflict between these two well settled principles — the scope of the immunity of judges of superior courts and the protection of public officers in the discharge of their duties.”— Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C.

He noted that the acts complained of were performed by the Chief Judge in his capacity as a judge and by the D.P.P. as a public officer. Both acted virtute officii — in the course of their official functions — and thus could not be held personally liable.

Construction of Section 88(1) of the High Court Law

The court gave a detailed interpretation of Section 88(1) of the High Court Law of Lagos State, which provides:

“No judge shall be liable for any act done by him or ordered by him to be done in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction.”

The court held that the protection offered by this section covers all judicial acts done in good faith, even when the judge acts under a mistaken belief as to jurisdiction. It is sufficient that the act was performed in a judicial capacity and in honest belief of authority.

“The test is not whether the act was right or wrong, but whether it was done in the honest belief that it was within jurisdiction.”— Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C.

Accordingly, the court found that the Chief Judge, in granting consent for prosecution, was acting within his judicial functions as required by Section 340(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, and thus enjoyed complete immunity from suit.

On the Liability of Public Officers

The court reaffirmed the principle that public officers are protected under Section 2(1) of the Public Officers Protection Lawwhen sued for acts done in execution of their official duties, provided the action is not brought within the limitation period.

“An action against a public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any law must be brought within the period prescribed by the statute, otherwise it is statute-barred.”— Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C.

Since the appellant’s suit was filed outside the prescribed period, his claim against the D.P.P. was properly dismissed.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It held:

That the Chief Judge of Lagos State was immune from civil liability for acts done in his judicial capacity, even if such acts were alleged to be malicious or improperly motivated.That the Director of Public Prosecutions, being a public officer, was protected under the Public Officers Protection Law, and the claim against him was statute-barred.

That the application for declaratory reliefs was frivolous and amounted to an abuse of court process, especially since the indictment had already been quashed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court also reiterated that a declaratory judgment may be refused where it is sought for a scandalous or vexatious purpose.

The apex court in there Dictum emphasised the following:

“The claim is essentially a challenge as to the validity of the act of the judge and a public officer in the discharge of their duties as such. The only issue to be determined is whether the action against the defendants in the circumstances is maintainable in law.”— Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C.

“No judge shall be liable for any act done by him or ordered by him to be done in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction.”

“Where a judge acts in honest belief that his act is within jurisdiction, he is protected; but where he acts without jurisdiction and not in good faith, protection may not apply. However, the court will presume good faith unless clearly disproved.”

The Supreme Court’s decision in Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor (1985) stands as a defining statement on judicial immunity and the protection of public officers in Nigeria. It emphasizes that while the judiciary must be held accountable through appellate mechanisms, personal suits against judges for judicial acts cannot be sustained, as this would erode judicial independence.

This case continues to be cited as authority for the principle that no civil action lies against a judge for acts done in his judicial capacity, and that public officers are insulated from belated suits arising from official acts.

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